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ABSTRACT: 
A well-known trilemma faces the interpretation of Kant’s theory of affection, namely whether the objects that 
affect us are empirical, noumenal, or both. I argue that according to Kant, the things that affect us and cause 
representations in us are not empirical objects. I articulate what I call the Causal Power Argument, according 
to which empirical objects cannot affect us because they do not have the right kind of power to cause 
representations. All the causal powers that empirical objects have are moving powers, and such powers can 
only have spatial effects. According to Kant, however, the representations that arise in us as a result of the 
affection of our sensibility are non-spatial. I show that this argument is put forward by Kant in a number of 
passages, and figures as a decisive reason for rejecting empirical affection and instead endorsing affection by 
the things in themselves. 
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Kant claims in the KrV that objects can be given to us only if they affect us (cf. A19/B33).
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This claim has generated a great amount of controversy. The source of the controversy is 
Kant’s distinction between two senses of the term ‘object’, namely the object as appearance 
and the object as thing in itself (cf. Bxxvii). This gives rise to the question: Which sense(s) 
of the term is Kant referring to when claiming that objects must affect us? 
Three basic positions have been advocated:  
Noumenal affection (NA): The affecting objects are things in themselves. 
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Empirical affection (EA): The affecting objects are appearances. 
Double affection (DA): The affecting objects include both things in themselves and 
appearances.
2
 
No consensus has been reached concerning which of these positions represent Kant’s 
actual view, and each of them still has defenders within contemporary Kant scholarship.
3
 In 
this article, I will examine a relatively neglected argument against empirical affection, and 
thus against both EA and DA (since DA requires empirical as well as noumenal affection). 
Kant puts forward this neglected argument on several occasions, and affirms NA as a result 
of accepting it.  
The argument can be termed the ‘Causal Power Argument’. It takes as its starting point a 
feature of Kant’s account of causal relations. Commentators such as Langsam, Langton, 
and Watkins have pointed out that Kant conceives of causal relations as grounded in the 
causal powers [Kräfte] of things.
4
 The Causal Power Argument then turns on Kant’s view, 
expounded in the Critical period and expressed most clearly in MAN, concerning the kind 
of causal powers that empirical outer objects, i.e., appearances in space, can have.
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According to Kant, they do not have the kind of causal power required in order to cause 
representations. They only have moving powers, i.e., powers to cause changes in spatial 
relations. Representations, however, are not located in space at all. This implies that there 
is no causal affection relation between us, understood as representing subjects, and outer 
empirical objects.
6
 
The Causal Power Argument can be arranged in the following manner: 
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1. Affection is a causal relation between object and subject, the effect of which is 
representations. 
2. Causal relations require suitable causal powers. 
3. Empirical objects have no other causal powers than moving powers. 
4. Moving powers are powers to cause changes in spatial relations. 
5. Representations do not stand in spatial relations. 
6. (From 4, 5) Moving powers cannot cause representations. 
7. (From 6, 3) Empirical objects have no causal power to cause representations. 
8. (From 7, 2, 1) Empirical objects do not affect us. 
In the following I will concentrate on presenting the Causal Power Argument and showing 
that it was put forward and advocated by Kant. One can reasonably doubt whether Kant 
should have held its premises, and my aim is merely to show that he indeed did hold them. 
For this reason as well as others, the argument presented here falls short of a full-fledged 
defence of NA: As is well known, there are also problems concerning the intelligibility and 
consistency of noumenal affection, chief among them the problem of how to make sense of 
causation in a noumenal context. Recent scholarship has seen promising attempts to tackle 
this issue, and I will not contribute further to this task here.
7
 
My paper is divided into six sections. Section I explicates premises 1-2 of the Causal Power 
Argument and shows that Kant holds them, while section II does the same for premises 3-4. 
In section III, I first explain how ‘representation’ should be understood in premise 5 as 
well as in the rest of the argument, and then show that Kant holds this premise as well. In 
section IV, I show that Kant draws conclusions 6-8 from these premises, and that he 
moreover concludes in favor of NA as a result of accepting the Causal Power Argument. 
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Finally, section V considers two strategies for dealing with passages in which Kant seems to 
affirm empirical affection, while section VI summarizes the argument of the paper. 
 
I: Affection and Causal Power 
Premise 1 – Affection is a causal relation between object and subject, the effect of which is 
representations – is relatively uncontroversial. Kant’s initial statements concerning affection 
in KrV regard affection as a relation between object and subject, the effect of which is 
representations, for instance by characterizing sensibility as ‘the capacity (receptivity) to 
acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects’ (A19/B33, cf. 
A51/B75). 
It is occasionally denied that the affection relation is causal. Allison, for instance, suggests 
that ‘[a]ffection, as Kant construes it, is clearly an epistemic rather than a causal relation, 
albeit one that is inextricably connected with the latter’.8 The majority of commentators, 
however, hold that affection is causal.
9
 This is not so surprising, as the causal reading has 
strong textual support: Sensations appear to arise causally from affection, as the ‘effect 
[Wirkung] of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it’ 
(A19-20/B34, my italics). Similarly, the Prolegomena speaks of the ‘representations which 
[objects] produce [wirken] in us because they affect [afficiren] our senses’ (Prol, 4: 289, my 
italics). Moreover, Kant often shifts seemingly indiscriminately between ‘affection’ and 
‘influence’ (which is clearly a causal notion, cf. e.g. B111; MMr, 29: 823); in the sentence 
just following the one quoted from Prolegomena, Kant refers to ‘the representations which 
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[the objects’] influence [Einfluß] on our sensibility provides for us’ (Prol, 4: 289, my italics; 
cf. also B154). 
If one were to deny that affection is a causal relation, a modified version of the Causal 
Power Argument would still retain force. Chopping off premise 1 and conclusion 8 leaves 
an argument that still rules out any causal relation between empirical objects and the 
representing subject. While it would then not preclude empirical affection as a non-causal 
relation between empirical objects and the subject, as far as I am aware no commentator 
has defended such a view. Allison, for instance, asserts quite the opposite, namely a causal 
but non-affective relation between empirical object and subject: ‘Kant can perfectly well 
speak of a causal (as opposed to an affective) relation between phenomena and the human 
mind’ (2004: 67). This claim is still contradicted by a Causal Power Argument reduced to 
steps 2-7. 
Crucial to the Causal Power Argument is the notion of a causal power, first introduced in 
premise 2: Causal relations require suitable causal powers. Recent commentators have 
argued that Kant’s account of causality cannot be understood as an event-event model, but 
must be understood in terms of the causal powers of objects. Eric Watkins, perhaps the 
main figure responsible for bringing the importance of causal powers to light, summarizes: 
‘Causality occurs if one substance determines the state of another by actively exercising its 
causal powers according to their natures and circumstances’ (2005: 13).10 Causal power 
should be construed, according to Watkins, as the ‘causality of the cause’, i.e., ‘that aspect 
of a substance by means of which it can be a cause’ (2005: 249). Here I will briefly present 
textual grounds for thinking that Kant’s account of causal relations must include reference 
to causal powers.  
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Kant often conceptually subordinates power ‘under the category of causality’ (A82/B108; cf. 
Prol 4: 257; ÜE, 8: 223). In his discussion of causality in the Second Analogy, Kant says 
that ‘causality leads to the concept of action, this to the concept of power [Kraft], and 
thereby to the concept of substance’ (A204/B249; cf. A82/B108; ML2, 28: 564).11 
In the Analogy, Kant further claims that ‘all alteration is (…) possible only through a 
continuous action of causality’ (A208/B254), and that the ultimate agent of such an ‘action 
of causality’ must be a persisting substance: ‘Actions are always the primary ground of all 
change of appearances, and therefore cannot lie in a subject that itself changes (…). [O]n 
this account action, as a sufficient empirical criterion, proves substantiality’ (A205/B250). 
And according to Kant, the causality of a substance, exercised in such actions, is its power: 
‘The causality of a substance (…) is called “power”’ (A648/B676). Thus, he says that 
 
[h]ow in general anything can be altered (…) we have a priori not the least concept. For this 
acquaintance with actual powers is required, which can only be given empirically, e.g., 
acquaintance with moving powers, or what comes to the same thing, with certain successive 
appearances (as motions) which indicate such powers (A206-207/B252; cf. B66-67). 
 
The reason why successive appearances ‘indicate’ powers is that as alteration, this 
succession is possible only through an action of causality, i.e., through the exercise of a 
cause’s causal power. 
This reading is supported by Kant’s metaphysics lectures, wherein he states: ‘Action is the 
determination of the power of a substance as the cause of a certain accident’ (ML2, 28: 565), 
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and ‘[a]ll efficient causes <causae efficientes> are thus determinations of powers’ (MMr, 29: 
845, cf. 29: 840-841; ML2, 28: 572). And in the MAN, Kant explicates all causal relations 
between outer objects in terms of their attractive and repulsive powers (MAN, 4: 496f., see 
esp. 4: 499). 
A causal power is suitable insofar as it can serve as a ground for the right kind of effect: 
‘The relation of a substance to accidents insofar as it contains their ground is causality, and 
insofar as it contains a general ground for a certain kind of accidents, is power’ (MVo, 28: 
431). Attractive and repulsive power, for instance, is suitable as grounds for motion towards 
and motion away from the locus of power, respectively.  
To summarize the result of this section: Affection should be seen as a causal relation 
involving a suitable causal power of an object. The pertinent issue for our investigation then 
becomes: Does the empirical object have powers suitable for affecting the subject and 
thereby causing representations? 
 
II: Empirical Objects and Moving Powers 
Out of the premises of the Causal Power Argument, premise 3 – empirical objects have no 
other powers than moving powers – is in many ways the most surprising. The causal power 
model of causation is something Kant held throughout his life, beginning from his very first 
work on the vis viva controversy in 1747. But in that work Kant argued – against pre-
established harmony and occasionalist views – that mind-body interaction was perfectly 
conceivable, since the general notion of active power allowed matter to have other such 
powers than merely the power to cause motion.
12
 Once we have a suitably general 
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understanding of power along the lines of ‘the causality of the cause’, there is nothing 
preventing us from conceiving of matter as having a fundamental power to cause 
representations.
13
 
As late as the Metaphysik L1 lectures of the mid-1770s, Kant argues that while we cannot 
comprehend a priori the powers by means of which soul and body interact, we can 
nonetheless experience them: 
 
We cannot have insight through reason into the reciprocal determination between thinking 
and willing and between moving. (…) But through experience we can comprehend it; and 
indeed this applies not here alone, but rather all basic powers are given to us through 
experience, and none can be comprehended through reason (ML1, 28: 279, cf. 28: 259-261; 
R5457 (1776-78), 18: 187). 
 
Kant here conceives the ability to cause representations as a basic power of bodies, 
experienced by us, and no more incomprehensible than other basic powers of bodies, like 
the powers of attraction and repulsion. 
At some point between these lectures and KrV, however, Kant came to retract the claim 
that we experience the basic power of bodies to cause representations in our soul; instead 
he came to hold that the only powers of bodies that we experience are their moving powers, 
and thus premise 3. This is expressed most clearly in the MAN, as I will show, where Kant 
develops an account of the most fundamental powers of outer, empirical objects in space. 
 9 
 
Premise 4 expresses what such moving powers are: Moving powers are powers to cause 
changes in spatial relations. 
Kant’s account of the two fundamental powers of outer objects is well known. The account 
occupies the second section of the MAN, the Dynamics. In the Dynamics, Kant considers 
matter insofar as it fills a space. This requires reference not merely to its motion, but to the 
cause of its motions, namely its moving powers [Bewegungskräfte]: ‘It (…) adds a property 
relating as cause to an effect, namely, the power to resist a motion within a certain space’ 
(MAN, 4: 496). This is repulsive power, to which we must add a second fundamental 
power, namely attractive power (cf. MAN, 4: 508f.). 
What is less often noted or discussed is that Kant claims to provide a complete account of 
the fundamental powers of matter. He holds that all moving powers are ultimately 
reducible to the two fundamental powers (cf. MAN, 4: 499, 4: 532). More importantly, he 
states that matter has no other powers than moving powers:  
 
The general principle of the dynamics of material nature is that everything real in the 
objects of outer senses, which is not merely a determination of space (place, extension, and 
figure) must be viewed as moving power (…). [T]he concept of matter is reduced to nothing 
but moving powers, and one could not expect anything else, since no activity or change can 
be thought in space except mere motion (MAN, 4: 523-524). 
 
The empirical objects of premise 3 are the ‘objects of outer senses’, and Kant here states 
that ‘everything real’ in them is moving power. MAN contains the metaphysical 
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foundations of the science of ‘the objects of the outer senses, [i.e.,] extended nature’ (MAN, 
4: 467); and as we can now see, among its principles is that these objects have only one 
kind of power, namely moving power. 
In KrV, Kant accordingly claims that the ‘substance that appears in space’ possesses only 
moving powers: 
 
We know [kennen] substance in space only through powers that are efficacious in it, 
whether in drawing others to it (attraction) or in preventing penetration of it (repulsion and 
impenetrability); we are not acquainted with [kennen nicht] other properties constituting 
the concept of the substance that appears in space and which we call matter (A265/B321). 
 
Similarly, he states that through outer intuition we cognize only moving powers: ‘Everything 
in our cognition that belongs to [outer] intuition (…) contains nothing but mere relations, of 
places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance 
with which this alteration is determined (moving powers)’ (B66-67). In 1786 Kant also 
writes: ‘[T]he thing in space, apart from there being space in it (…), shows no further effect 
than movement (…), consequently no other power or passive property than moving power 
and movability (alteration of external relations)’ (EB, 8: 153; cf. also MMr, 29: 908, 29: 929, 
29: 934). 
Could it be that while we do not know other powers than moving powers, empirical objects 
may still have other powers? Kant considers the possibility of making ‘entirely new 
concepts of substances, of powers, and of interactions (…), without borrowing the example 
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of their connection from experience’ (A222/B269), but his estimation of the usefulness of 
such invented concepts is decidedly negative: ‘[O]ne would end up with nothing but 
figments of the brain, for the possibility of which there would be no indications at all’ 
(A222/B269), since without being ‘grounded in experience and its known laws, (…) it is an 
arbitrary combination of thoughts that, although it contains no contradiction, still can make 
no claim to objective reality’ (A223/B270). As ‘arbitrary combination of thoughts’, 
empirical powers other than moving powers would remain a mere logical possibility, which 
does not suffice to challenge premise 3 – that would require at least the real possibility (and 
plausibly the real actuality) of such powers.
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One could still object to equating empirical objects with MAN’s concept of matter, by 
arguing that life pertains to (some) empirical objects but not to matter as such. In MAN, 
Kant states that ‘all matter, as such, is lifeless’ (MAN, 4: 544), defining life as ‘the faculty of 
a substance to determine itself to act from an internal principle, of a finite substance to 
change, and of a material substance [to determine itself] to motion or rest, as change of its 
state’ (MAN, 4: 544). The ‘internal principle’ in question involves representation (cf. MAN, 
4: 544; MS, 6: 211; ML2, 28: 594). KU speaks of an ‘organized being’ as 
 
not a mere machine, for that has only a motive power, while the organized being possesses 
in itself a formative power [bildende Kraft], and indeed one that it communicates to the 
matter, which does not have it (it organizes the latter); thus it has a self-propagating 
formative power, which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that 
is, mechanism) (KU, 5: 374). 
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If some empirical objects are living, organized beings, they have other powers than the 
moving powers that may be ascribed to matter as such.
15
 
However, according to Kant we cannot objectively or constitutively ascribe life or formative 
power to empirical objects. The concept of natural end, that according to Kant underlies 
the notion of organized or living beings in nature, is 
 
not a constitutive concept of the understanding or of reason, but (…) a regulative concept 
for the reflecting power of judgment, for guiding research into objects of this kind (…); not 
of course, for the sake of knowledge [Kenntniß] of nature or of its original ground (KU, 5: 
375). 
 
As a merely regulative concept (cf. KU, 5: 379, 5: 396), it allows us to proceed as if (cf. KU, 
5: 404, 5: 422) these objects have an ‘internal principle’ and power, but ‘never justifies us in 
introducing into natural science a special kind of agency [Wirkungsart] distinct from 
causality in accordance with merely mechanical laws of nature’ (KU, 5: 390), i.e., in 
accordance with moving powers. In other words, the objective reality of this concept can be 
established neither through experience nor through reason (cf. KU, 5: 396). In accordance 
with premise 3, then, life and its accompanying powers are not, for Kant, validly ascribed to 
empirical (outer) objects (although we can validly proceed as if certain empirical objects are 
living). 
Premise 4 can be established in two quick steps. First, Kant claims that moving powers are 
powers to cause motion: ‘The cause of a motion is called a moving power’ (MAN, 4: 497). 
 13 
 
Second, according to Kant the motion of an object is a change of its spatial relations: 
‘Motion of a thing is the change of its outer relations to a given space’ (MAN, 4: 482).16 
Thus moving powers are the causes of changes in a thing’s outer relations (cf. MMr, 29: 
841). From these two steps, premise 4 – moving powers are powers to cause changes in 
spatial relations – can be concluded. 
Above, we questioned whether the empirical object has suitable powers for causing 
representations. Having now found that all the powers of the empirical object are moving 
powers, the question is: Can moving powers cause representations? 
 
III: The Non-Spatiality of Representations 
This section is dedicated to the task of defending premise 5: Representations do not stand 
in spatial relations. Explicating this premise requires me to first specify the meaning of the 
term ‘representations’ as used in the premise, before I can proceed to present textual 
evidence for it. 
I will not argue that in all senses of the term ‘representation’, they cannot stand in outer 
relations. Kant repeatedly claims that outer appearances, i.e., empirical objects in space, are 
representations,
17
 and that ‘motion itself (hence also the matter that makes itself knowable 
through it) is a mere representation’ (A387). In saying that representations do not stand in 
spatial relations (premise 5), I of course do not mean to say that matter and its motions do 
not stand in spatial relations. I will instead show that there is an important sense of the term 
‘representation’ on which representations cannot stand in outer relations, and that it is this 
kind of representation that results from affection. I will call representation in this sense S-
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representation (S for ‘subjective’), and argue that it is S-representation that figures in 
premises 1, 5, 6, and 7 in the argument of the paper. This sense, I take it, is distinct from 
the sense in which motion and outer appearances can be considered representations, which 
we may call O-representation (for ‘objective’). 
What are S-representations? Pre-theoretically, S-representation is quite a straightforward 
notion to grasp: The private stream of successive mental states or acts such as thoughts, 
feelings, perceptions, etc., that goes on in my mind (as opposed to yours) and that is only 
directly accessible to me, consists of S-representations.
18
 These are distinct from the outer 
appearances, i.e., empirical objects in space, which are relatively persistent and publicly 
accessible.  
Kant adheres to this distinction, for instance in the Second Analogy, where he discusses the 
successive ‘apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house’ (A190/B235), a 
manifold he distinguishes from ‘the manifold of this house itself’ (A190/B235). In the 
manifold of the appearance, ‘the representations of the parts succeed one another’ 
(A189/B234); but when it comes to the manifold of the house itself, i.e., its parts, ‘no one 
will concede’ (A190/B235), including Kant, that they are successive. The successive 
apprehension of the manifold gives a succession of S-representations, while the parts of the 
house, as parts of an empirical object, are coexisting O-representations. This should 
indicate why I label S-representation as subjective: The house and its parts is objective, 
while our successive perceptions of its parts are subjective.  
Given Kant’s transcendental idealism, there is a tight relation between S-representations 
and O-representations; depending on one’s reading of transcendental idealism as well as 
Kant’s theory of perception, this relation can be cashed out in a variety of different ways. 
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One suitably neutral and non-committal (for my purposes) way of cashing out the relation 
is to say that O-representations are represented by (some, actual or possible) S-
representations.
19
 In any case, my interpretation hinges only on what I take it that any 
plausible Kant interpretation will have to admit, namely that S- and O-representations are 
different, and that their properties might diverge significantly (as in the above house 
example where the S-representations are successive, but the O-representations are 
coexistent). 
While S-representations can clearly represent external relations in space (e.g. a house), the 
question is whether they themselves can be or stand in external relations in space. The 
latter, not the former, is needed if moving powers are to be the cause of S-representations 
(rather than the cause of what these S-representations represent). 
There are many indications that S-representations are not themselves spatial: In the 
Aesthetic, Kant states that ‘space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an a 
priori condition merely to outer intuitions’, whereas ‘all representations, whether or not 
they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind belong to 
the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, 
and thus of time’ (A34/B50), and he often points out that only outer appearances are in 
space, whereas all appearances are in time; within our mind ‘everything is in continual flux’ 
since ‘time, which is the only form of our inner intuition, has in it nothing abiding’ (A381, 
my italics, cf. A107; R5653, 18: 307, R5655, 18: 314-315). The Refutation of Idealism also 
seems to presuppose the non-spatial and hence non-abiding nature of S-representations: 
Only given this presupposition would Kant’s claim that the persisting thing required for 
time-determination ‘cannot be an intuition in me’ (Bxxxix) make sense.20  
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More explicit denials that S-representations are spatial can also be found: 
 
Extension, impenetrability, composition and motion – in short, everything our 
outer senses can transmit to us – are not thoughts, feelings, inclinations or 
decisions, and cannot contain them, as these are never objects of outer intuition 
(A358). 
 
Looking beyond the KrV, the Leningrad Reflexion states that ‘[i]t is impossible to think of 
representations as existing in space’ (LR, 27), and other reflections convey the same point: 
‘My representations cannot be outside me and an outer object of representations cannot be 
in me, for that would be a contradiction’ (R6315, 18: 620; cf. R6312, 18: 612-613). Similar 
statements are found throughout the metaphysics lectures: 
 
All determinations of the soul are ordered not according to space but rather 
merely according to time (ML2, 28: 584). 
All representations are something in us, and we cannot say that they are objects of 
the outer senses. But all matter is an object of the outer senses, and we can assume 
nothing of its inner representations. With matter we have nothing other than outer 
relations and alterations of outer relations (MK2, 28: 759-760).21  
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These passages together constitute strong textual evidence that there is a sense of 
‘representation’, namely what I have called S-representation, on which representations are 
‘inner determinations’ (cf. A283/B339) which are not in space and do not stand in spatial 
relations.
22
 
In premise 1, the representations are sensations: ‘The effect of an object on our capacity 
for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation’ (A19-20/B34). Many of the 
characterizations that Kant gives of sensation indicate that it should be understood as S-
representation: sensation is a ‘merely subjective representation, by which one can only be 
conscious that the subject is affected’ (B207), and ‘refers to the subject as a modification of 
its state’ (A320/B376). Moreover, Kant distinguishes sensation from the sensible properties 
of empirical objects, where these properties are as ‘the real, which corresponds to it [i.e., 
the sensation] in the object (realitas phaenomenon)’ (A165; cf. A20/B34, A581/B609, 
A723/B751).
23
 While the realitas phaenomenon might not be an S-representation, the 
sensation corresponding to it in the subject is.
24
 
If S-representations were outer relations, they would have to be determinations of matter in 
space. A natural suggestion would be to conceive of S-representations as states of our 
sensory organs and/or our brain.
25
 Kant, however, refuses to go further than saying that to 
our empirical representations ‘there can be assumed to correspond impressions 
[Eindrücke] in the brain’ (SÖ, 12: 32n.). The impressions in the brain correspond to 
representations, rather than being representations. And elsewhere, Kant is clear that matter 
(including the brain) cannot have representations: ‘All natural science rests on the 
proposition: that matter can have no representations’ (MVo, 28: 449; cf. MD, 28: 681; MK2, 
28: 754, 28: 760). 
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IV: The Denial of Empirical Affection 
To recapitulate, the Causal Power Argument goes as follows (now with the sense of 
‘representation’ specified as S-representation):  
1. Affection is a causal relation between object and subject, the effect of which is S-
representations. 
2. Causal relations require suitable causal powers. 
3. Empirical objects have no other causal powers than moving powers. 
4. Moving powers are powers to cause changes in spatial relations. 
5. S-representations do not stand in spatial relations. 
6. (From 4, 5) Moving powers cannot cause S-representations. 
7. (From 6, 3) Empirical objects have no causal power to cause S-representations. 
8. (From 7, 2, 1) Empirical objects do not affect us. 
In the preceding sections, I have argued that Kant held premises 1-5. In this section, I will 
present evidence that Kant himself drew conclusions 6-8. Some interpreters have noticed 
this evidence, but its rationale has hitherto been insufficiently appreciated, with for instance 
Hogan simply noting it as a ‘remarkable point’.26 Seeing that Kant accepts and appeals to 
premises 1-5 – sometimes more, sometimes less explicitly so – helps us understand the 
reasoning underlying these claims.  
Premises 1 and 2 are general claims that one would not expect to see in this argumentative 
context. Premises 3-5, however, can be found in more or less truncated forms. The 
following passage from an early 1790s metaphysics lecture is among the more elaborate:  
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Bodies as bodies cannot act upon the soul and vice versa, because bodies cannot 
have any relations at all to a thinking being. The outer relations in which a body 
stands with a substance is only in space, thus this substance must also be in space, 
therefore a body. Locations are pure relations. Alterations of the locations is 
alteration of the relations. The filling of space, the figure of the body, i.e., the 
alteration of the boundaries are sheer relations. With the soul we can name only 
what is altered internally, but these are not relations, but rather only accidents 
<accidentia>, e.g., representations, etc. Since the relation of the body consists only 
in space, then it cannot be the ground of the inner determinations, e.g., of the 
representations (MK2, 28: 758). 
 
Premise 5 – that S-representations do not stand in spatial relations – is discernable in the 
contrast between ‘outer relations’ in space and what is ‘altered internally’, and the claim that 
‘these [the ‘representations, etc.’] are not relations’. Premises 3 and 4 are less evident; thus 
it is not quite clear from the passage precisely why ‘bodies as bodies cannot act upon the 
soul’, since this cannot be deduced from premise 5 (along with 1 and 2) alone. However, 
the claim that ‘the relation of the body consists only in space’ can be taken to also include, 
importantly, its powers, since Kant often includes moving powers under the broad label of 
outer ‘relations’ (cf. e.g. B66-67). This explains why Kant goes on to say of the body that ‘it 
cannot be the ground of the inner determinations’. For, as he says just after: ‘Between 
motions and representations there is not the least connection’ (MK2, 28: 759). 
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Kant goes on to draw a further conclusion not part of the Causal Power Argument, namely, 
the affirmation of NA. The passage continues as follows: 
 
The body as phenomenon is not in community with the soul, but rather the 
substance distinct from the soul, whose appearance is called body. This substrate 
of the body is an outer determining ground of the soul, but how this interaction 
<commercium> is constituted, we do not know (…) If we say the intelligible of the 
body acts upon the soul, then this means this outer body’s noumenon determines 
the soul (MK2, 28: 758-759). 
 
Supposing that there are only three available alternatives for explicating the affection 
relation, we can see why Kant would draw this further conclusion: If empirical affection is 
denied, then, since both EA and DA requires empirical affection, NA is the only remaining 
alternative. 
In a different metaphysics lecture from 1792-93, Kant first states that: 
 
We can never obtain representations from the motions of matter, thus materialism 
has no influence on psychology (…) with matter we always find nothing but outer 
relations (MD, 28: 682). 
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Again, this should be read as short-hand for the claim that we can never obtain 
representations from the motions of matter, or from its moving powers. A bit later in the 
lecture, Kant repeats this thought, in explaining why bodies as bodies cannot affect the soul: 
 
Bodies as bodies cannot effect the soul because no relation is possible here. The 
outer relation in which a body stands with another substance can be thought only 
in space. But the concepts of body and matter themselves contain sheer relations. 
But with the internal alterations there occur not merely relations, but rather 
accidents (…). Bodies are phenomena, their substrate, - the intelligible noumenon, 
and it is this which has influence on the soul – one cannot explain this (MD, 28: 
685). 
 
I take it that the ‘internal alterations’ that involve ‘not merely relations, but rather accidents’ 
are alterations of the representations that the soul has, similarly to the MK2, 28: 758 passage 
previously considered. Again, Kant is here expressing something like premise 5. The two 
first sentences of the quote obliquely express premises 3-4 as well: ‘Bodies as bodies’ are 
bodies as phenomena, and they cannot affect the soul because the ‘outer relation in which 
a body stands with another substance’, i.e., influence by means of moving powers, ‘can be 
thought only in space’. As a result, it must be the ‘intelligible noumenon’ that has influence 
on the soul. 
The fact that Kant talks about ‘the soul’ in these passages should not mislead us into 
thinking that he is concerned merely with influence on the noumenal soul (which bodies as 
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bodies obviously could not have). His concern is more generally what kind of influence 
could result in representations, as is clear from the following 1794-95 lecture note: 
 
The community of the soul with the body cannot be thought at all, as long as that which is 
phenomenon in each is taken; (…) e.g., in regard to pleasure and displeasure, also in regard 
to the power of imagination (…). [T]he representation (…) is produced in us not by the 
phenomenon itself of the body but, rather by the substrate of matter (MVi, 29: 1028-1029, 
my italics). 
 
In these passages,
27
 Kant expresses his own view rather than Baumgarten’s. Baumgarten 
concurs with the impossibility of empirical affection, but endorses ideal influence and pre-
established harmony (cf. Baumgarten 2013: §448f.) rather than, as Kant does, real 
influence between noumena as a solution: 
 
To think this influence <influxus> on one another between soul and body 
materially, and yet so that both would be outside each other, and each for itself, is 
something in itself impossible: and if one assumes it ideally, then this would be 
nothing but the preestablished harmony <harmonia praestabilita>, and would no 
longer be influence <influxus>. It must thus be thought as the immaterial effect of 
the noumenon of each (MVi, 29: 1029, italics in original; cf. MMr, 29: 908).28 
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The line of argument suggested by these metaphysics lectures can be found in KrV as well. 
I leave aside here the discussion of soul-body interaction in the Fourth Paralogism of the A 
edition, even though hints of the Causal Power Argument can be found there;
29
 Kant’s 
discussion mainly makes a different point concerning the circularity of assigning empirical 
objects as causes of our representations, and the passage itself is also somewhat maligned 
because of its strong phenomenalist flavor and its excision in the B Edition.
30
  
Kant holds that psychology, in investigating the ‘appearances of our soul’, i.e., our S-
representations, should proceed so that ‘empirical laws of corporeal appearances, which 
are of an entirely different species, will not be mixed up in the explanation of what belongs 
merely to inner sense’ (A683/B711). These empirical laws are the ‘laws in accordance with 
which [alteration of places] is determined (moving powers)’ (B66-67), which are of a 
‘different species’, and hence unsuitable for explaining that which belongs merely to inner 
sense, i.e., non-spatial S-representations. Instead, psychology should proceed as ‘a 
consideration of [the] object of inner sense as a whole (…) [which] will not be mixed up 
with properties of any different kind’ (A683/B711; cf. MD, 28: 682).31 
In a note to the first edition, at A211, Kant claims that: ‘Space makes community possible. 
Now since the thinking being with all its faculties, whose effects belong merely to inner 
sense, is not a relation of space, the commercium of the soul with the body is therefore not 
comprehensible’ (N, 23: 31-32). Here we can assume the presence of premises 1-5 in a 
very truncated form in the claim that ‘the thinking being with all its faculties, whose effects 
belong merely to inner sense, is not a relation of space’ – the ‘effects’ in question here 
should be understood as the S-representations, which ‘belong merely to inner sense’ 
(premise 5), and are not ‘in a relation of space’ (which is a problem because of premises 3 
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and 4). The conclusion, that ‘the commercium of the soul with the body is therefore not 
comprehensible’, is recognizably the same as that from the metaphysics lecture where Kant 
states that ‘how this interaction <commercium> is constituted, we do not know’ (MK2, 28: 
758), although Kant does not in this note explicitly affirm NA. 
The B Edition of KrV follows the same route to arrive at a resulting endorsement of NA. 
Towards the end of the B Paralogisms, Kant broaches ‘the problem of explaining the 
community of the soul with the body’ (B427). While, he says, a discussion of this problem 
does not properly belong to the Paralogisms qua criticism of the claims of rational 
psychology, Kant nonetheless believes that he can offer a ‘sufficient reply’ (B427) to the 
problem. He begins in a now familiar way by summarizing the difficulty as involving the 
heterogeneity between the objects of outer sense, which are in space, and the soul (as 
object of inner sense) which is only in time: 
 
The difficulty presented by this problem consists, as is well known, in the 
presumed difference in kind between the object of inner sense (the soul) and the 
object of outer sense, since to the former only time pertains as the formal 
condition of its intuition, while to the latter space pertains also (B427). 
 
Kant does not specify why this difference in kind presents a problem. Indeed, the passage 
by itself can seem to invite a more general interpretation along lines suggested by Ameriks: 
‘heterogeneous things in themselves cannot interact with each other’,32 or better (since Kant 
refers not to things in themselves but to objects of inner and outer sense), that 
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heterogeneous things cannot interact with each other. This assertion seems rather 
unsupported, however, as Ameriks points out;
33
 it would moreover contradict the solution 
to the Third Antinomy concerning the compatibility of freedom and determinism, which is 
premised precisely on the view that causal interaction can take place between 
heterogeneous things, e.g., between the free subject in itself as cause and changes in 
appearances as effects.
34
 If the explication given in this paper is on the mark, however, 
Kant’s terse statement adumbrates not a general heterogeneity problem concerning 
‘difference in kind’, but a specific one, pertaining to the powers of the objects of outer 
sense in relation to the soul and its non-spatial inner determinations, i.e., S-representations. 
This explains why Kant refers to space and time in the passage: The fact that ‘only time’ 
pertains to the object of inner sense and its S-representations implies premise 5, while the 
spatial nature of bodies and their powers (as moving powers) implies premises 3-4.  
Together, these generate the Causal Power Argument that results in the denial of empirical 
affection, hence Kant’s suggested solution appeals to the noumenal, to what ‘grounds the 
appearance’: 
 
But if one considers that the two kinds of object are different not inwardly but only 
insofar as one of them appears outwardly to the other, hence what grounds the 
appearance of matter as thing in itself might perhaps not be so different in kind, 
then this difficulty vanishes (B427-428). 
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Again, we see that the appeal to noumenal interaction fills in for the lack of interaction 
between outer and inner appearances, including, I have argued, the notorious affection of 
the subject resulting in representations. 
 
V: Whither Empirical Affection? 
There are many passages in which Kant seems to affirm empirical affection.
35
 I cannot here 
provide a comprehensive discussion of all of these passages. However, unless an alternative 
way of reading them is at least sketched, the Causal Power Argument threatens to saddle 
Kant with inconsistent commitments. I will thus propose, with relevant examples, two 
strategies for reading these passages so as to disavow commitment to empirical affection: 
1. Kant may sometimes use ‘affection’ more broadly than explicated in section I, to mean 
something like a causal relation between objects and the human being in general, the effect 
of which need not be limited to representations. This would allow for an innocuous kind of 
empirical affection: The affection of our (physical) sense organs by other objects in space. 
Some of the passages where Kant seems to affirm empirical affection can be read as saying 
not that empirical objects cause representations by affecting us, but rather that they cause 
changes in our physical sense organs. For instance, when Kant states that ‘the light that 
plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies effect a mediate community between us 
and the latter’ (A213/B260, my italics), he might refer to physical interaction between our 
own physical body and other bodies, rather than between bodies and us qua representing 
subjects. The reference to our physical organ of sight (‘our eyes’), and the fact that the 
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Third Analogy concerns only the community of substances in space (cf. B256), supports 
this reading. 
2. On many occasions, Kant simply takes for granted that there is interaction between body 
and soul, while bracketing the issue of how such interaction is possible (whether empirically 
or noumenally). In these contexts, he speaks nonchalantly of mutual influence between 
body and soul, without thereby affirming specifically empirical affection. This is often the 
case in his writings on physiology and anthropology. Similarly, Kant often speaks matter-of-
factly about teleology and animal mentality, although (as we saw in section II) strictly 
speaking this should be construed only regulatively. If empirical affection presupposes the 
life of our own body, as origin of representations (through our sense organs) and governed 
by representations (through intentional action), it is not surprising if Kant espouses the 
same regulative stance towards affection. 
In MMr Kant asserts that  
 
[s]oul and body are in interaction, and this interaction is so strong that even mere thinking 
already has an influence on the body. The soul works immediately on the nervous system, 
and the remaining parts of the body are mere instruments through which it works by means 
of the nervous system. It is the business of anthropology to determine this interaction more 
closely (MMr, 29: 907). 
 
This passage seems to indicate empirical interaction between thinking and the nervous 
system. However, in the very next sentence Kant states that ‘[w]e consider now (…) the 
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possibility of the interaction’ (MMr, 29: 907). In explaining this possibility, he reverts to the 
point that ‘motion and thinking are so different that one cannot comprehend how the one 
is supposed to have an effect on the other; but the body is a phenomenon and 
consequently its properties are as well. We are not acquainted with its substrate’ (MMr, 29: 
908). Hence Kant shifts the question to the noumenal level, to ‘how this [i.e., the substrate] 
could be in interaction with the soul’ (MMr, 29: 908).  
Indeed, causal interaction is part of Kant’s account of the regulative function of the idea of 
the soul: One of its properties is ‘standing in community with other real things outside it’ 
(A682/B710). By regulatively assuming such causal community, we can investigate inner 
sense without allowing ‘empirical laws of corporeal appearances’ to be ‘mixed up in the 
explanation’ (A683/B711); similarly, teleology’s regulative function obviates misguided 
constitutive alternatives (like hylozoism). This allows us to speak as if soul and body 
interact empirically, while respecting the Causal Power Argument. 
 
VI: Conclusion 
I have argued that in the Critical period, Kant rejects empirical affection of the subject by 
outer objects because of the Causal Power Argument. According to this argument, for us to 
be affected by an object, that object must have a suitable power for causing the resulting 
representations. Empirical objects, however, do not have suitable powers; they have 
nothing but moving powers, and moving powers cannot cause the non-spatial 
representations resulting from affection. Given that some affection is required, and that 
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noumenal and empirical affection are the only two kinds, the denial of empirical affection 
leads Kant to affirm noumenal affection. 
The Causal Power Argument is a rather familiar argument: It resonates with dualistic 
worries concerning mind-body interaction that occupy center stage in post-Cartesian 
philosophy. Kant’s transcendentally idealist distinction between appearances and things in 
themselves allows him to give proper weight to considerations both in favor of and against 
interactionist dualism: Throughout his career Kant consistently maintains an interactionist 
position on metaphysical grounds (cf. Watkins 1995). However, his Critical framework 
confirms the kind of worries expressed e.g. by Princess Elisabeth, specified in the Causal 
Power Argument through an account of physical objects as possessing nothing but moving 
powers. In denying that these objects are things in themselves, Kant can hold on to 
interaction, while relegating it to the noumenal realm. 
Accepting the Causal Power Argument should lead us to reexamine Kant’s repeated claim 
that he is proposing an empirical dualism (cf. A367, A370, A379; MMr, 29: 928; MD, 28: 
680; MK2, 28: 771; R5653, 18: 309-310). While not perhaps a full-blown substance dualism, 
Kant at least proposes a dualism with respect to empirical causation: Outer effects have 
outer causes, while inner effects (i.e., representations) have inner causes. An estimation of 
the consequences of this fact for the peculiar nature and prospects of Kant’s empirical 
psychology is a topic that awaits further discussion. 
Among these consequences may be a reconsideration of the role of regulative ideas in 
psychology. I have suggested that passages where Kant seems to be talking of empirical 
affection can be read either as physical interaction between outer objects and our sense 
organs, or as discussing affection regulatively, while ultimately granting it noumenal status. 
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My main aim in the article, however, has been to explicate the Causal Power Argument 
and show that it can be attributed to Kant.
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1
 References to Kant’s works give the Akademie Ausgabe volume and page, except the Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft where I use the standard A/B edition pagination. Exception is the ‘Leningrad 
Reflexion’, where I refer to the transcription published in Kant-Forschungen. Translations are from 
the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, or, where unavailable, my own. Specific 
texts are abbreviated as follows: 
Anth: Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 
EB: Einige Bemerkungen zu Ludwig Heinrich Jakob’s Prüfung der Mendelssohn’schen 
Morgenstunden 
EE: Erste Einleitung in die ‚Kritik der Urteilskraft‘ 
FM: Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik 
KrV: Kritik der reinen Vernunft 
KU: Kritik der Urteilskraft 
LK: Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte  
LR: Leningrad Reflexion ‚Vom inneren Sinne‘ 
MAN: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft 
MD: Metaphysik Dohna 
MK2: Metaphysik K2 
ML1: Metaphysik L1 
ML2: Metaphysik L2 
MMr: Metaphysik Mrongovius 
MS: Metaphysik der Sitten 
MVi: Metaphysik Vigilantius 
MVo: Metaphysik Volckmann 
N: Nachträge zur ‚Kritik der reinen Vernunft‘ (1. Auflage) 
ND: Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio 
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Prol: Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten 
können 
R: Reflexionen 
Sö: Anhang zu Sömmering’s ‚Über das Organ der Seele‘ 
ÜE: Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere 
entbehrlich gemacht werden soll 
2
 These three possibilities are famously delineated as a ‘trilemma’ by Hans Vaihinger (1892: 52-53). 
The contemporary debate still uses Vahinger’s trilemma as a touchstone, cf. e.g. Allison (2004: 65-
66); Hall (2010: 38); Stang (2015); Piché, (2004: 275); Kitcher (2011: 203-204); Westphal, (2004:  
38-39). 
3
 See e.g. Hogan (2009) for NA; Nitzan (2010) for EA; and Stang (2015) for DA.  
4
 Cf. Langsam (1994); Langton (1998); Watkins (2004), (2005), and (2014). See also Henschen 
(2014). 
5
 In the following, I leave the topic of self-affection aside, and will thus be concerned only with the 
affection by outer objects. For brevity, I refer simply to ‘empirical objects’ rather than ‘empirical 
outer objects’ in the remainder of the article. 
6
 Or more precisely, it implies that no causal influence on us by empirical outer objects is possible. 
Considering the opposite direction is tricky, among other things because the extent to which the 
empirical self can be ascribed causal powers at all is controversial. My focus in this article will be 
solely on the subject-directed part of the subject-object causal interaction, i.e., the affection of the 
subject by the object.  
7
 See e.g. Hogan (2009); Piché (2004); Westphal (2004). 
8
 Allison (2004: 64). Cf. Gram (1985: 41f.). 
9
 See e.g. Stang (2015); Hall (2010: 45); de Boer (2014: 231-232); Hogan (2009: 514f.); Piché 
(2004); Kitcher (2011: ch. 12); Westphal (2004: 38f.). 
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10
 Watkins defends this account at length in his (2004) and (2005). For criticism of Watkins’ view, cf. 
Hennig (2011). 
11
 Translation of Kraft modified from ‘force’ to ‘power’. In the following, I will stick to ‘power’ as a 
translation of Kraft, and alter translations accordingly.  
12
 LK, §§5-6, 1: 20, cf. ND, 1: 415-416; see further Watkins (2005: 106-108).  
13
 Kant’s position here resembles Descartes’, who writes in his famous response to Gassendi 
concerning soul-body interaction: ‘The whole problem contained in such questions arises simply 
from a supposition that is false and cannot in any way be proved, namely that, if the soul and the 
body are two substances whose nature is different, this prevents them from being able to act on 
each other’ (Descartes 1984-1991: vol. II, 275). A letter to Princess Elisabeth diagnoses the source 
of the problem: ‘I think that we have hitherto confused the notion of the soul’s power to act on the 
body with the power one body has to act on another’ (Descartes 1984-1991: vol. III, 219). In LK, 
Kant similarly claims that understanding power as such in terms of physical motion leads to 
difficulties, and that ‘both difficulties [of the influence of soul on body, and body on soul] disappear, 
however (…) when the power of matter is ascribed not to motion, but rather to its actions on other 
substances, actions that must not be further determined’ (LK, §6, 1: 20). 
14
 It may seem that NA has no advantage over EA on this point, since noumenal powers are equally 
unknowable. However, this overlooks the inherent imbalance between the two kinds of claim: 
Unlike noumenal claims, valid empirical claims require objective reality. If we can only think, but 
not experience, powers through which objects affect us, this amounts to a confirmation of NA, not 
evidence that NA and EA are on a par as hypotheses. 
15
 Kant’s discussion of organized beings focuses on the power to cause motions on the basis of one’s 
representations, but the status of such a power could presumably be transferred to the converse 
power to have representations caused by the motions of one’s sensory organs.  
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16
 Kant also occasionally talks of motion in a different sense, namely as motion of the subject, rather 
than of an object. Cf. B155n., see further Pollok (2006). However, this sense is not relevant here. 
17
 Cf. e.g. B164, A191/B236, A250, A370f., A375, A386f., A490-491/B518-519, A494/B523, 
A498/B527; EE, 20: 209. The discussion of these ‘appearances are mere representations’ passages 
in the literature is vast and complex; representative contributions are Robinson (1994); Allison 
(1996: 12-13); Allais (2004).  
18
 As Ameriks (2011: 30) says, they are ‘merely subjective in an individual, psychological, and 
occurrent sense’. 
19
 Cf. e.g. the representing/represented distinction in Sellars (1967). Note, however, that what is 
represented by an S-representation might be another S-representation (cf. e.g. A108, A189/B234); 
but what is represented by an S-representation can be something that is not itself an S-
representation, for instance an empirical object in space. 
20
 This is brought out more clearly in some of Kant’s later Reflexionen on the topic, especially 
R5653, 18: 306-312, where Kant states: ‘[N]ot everything that is in time is also in space, e.g., my 
representations’ (18: 309). 
21
 Cf. also MMr, 29: 876, 29: 905-906; MVo, 28: 449; MVi, 29: 1028. 
22
 Note that the ‘virtual presence’ (MMr, 29: 909; MD, 28: 685-686; MK2, 28: 757; MVi, 29: 1029) 
of the soul and its representations in space does not help here: Moving powers are powers to cause 
changes in spatial relations, not changes in what is virtually present there. 
23
 See Aquila (1982). 
24
 This is not to say that only sensations as ‘merely subjective representations’ are S-representations. 
I take it that insofar as all representations belong to inner sense, as Kant often states (cf. A34/B50, 
A98-99, A101, A138/B177, A155/B194, A177/B220, A197/B242), all the kinds of representation 
mentioned by Kant e.g. in the A320/B376 Stufenleiter passage might be S-representations. This is 
not, however, directly relevant to the Causal Power Argument. 
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25
 Cf. Falkenstein (1990) and (1995: 119f.), who argues that sensations are ‘physical states of the 
nervous system in the sensing subject’ (1995: 123). 
26
 Hogan (2009: 525fn60). Powell (1988: 409) notes that ‘talk of causal interaction is appropriate 
within the framework of outer sense, where all effects are changes of location, or within the 
framework of inner sense, where all effects are (non-spatial) thoughts, but (…) it is incoherent to 
speak of causes within one of these frameworks having effects in the other’. He also sees that Kant 
appeals to noumenal influence as a result. However, he does not explicate why this is the case, or 
relate it to Kant’s theory of affection. Ameriks (2000: 89f.), also notes some of these passages; I 
discuss his reading briefly below. 
27
 Cf. also MMr, 29: 907-909; R5984, 18: 416. 
28
 ‘Immaterial’ here simply means that the effect is not ascribable to matter in space, but does not 
imply any positive cognition of what it is. 
29
 Especially the following: ‘What appears as matter could not, through its immediate influence, be 
the cause of representations, since these are an entirely heterogeneous species of effects’ (A390). 
However, this line of argument is put into the mouths of adherents to systems of ‘preestablished 
harmony’ and ‘supernatural assistance’ (A390), and it is not clear whether Kant intends to endorse 
the argument himself. In the sentences that follow Kant seems instead to be making a different 
point against empirical affection, namely that it would be viciously circular. 
30
 Cf. Kalter (1975). A passage from the A Fourth Paralogism raises a potential problem for the 
Causal Power Argument, as Kant seems to claim that empirical mind-body interaction is 
unproblematic since both mind and body are ‘mere representations’: ‘As long as we keep inner and 
outer appearances together with one another, as mere representations in experience, we find 
nothing absurd and nothing that makes the community of both modes of sense appear strange’ 
(A386). My response is that Kant is in all likelihood not affirming interaction in this passage; in the 
Third Analogy Kant discusses an ambiguity in the term ‘community’, where it ‘can mean either 
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communio or commercium’ (A213/B260). Both signify the membership of parts in a common 
whole, but only the latter signifies dynamical community, i.e., causal interaction between the parts. I 
take it that the Fourth Paralogism passage refers to the communio, rather than the commercium, 
between both modes of sense. This can be supported by first of all noting that Kant immediately 
before the above cited passage says that he is now only dealing with the question of ‘the conjunction 
[Verknüpfung] of representations in inner sense with the modifications of our outer sensibility, and 
how these may be conjoined with one another according to constant laws, so that they are 
connected into one experience’ (A386), which would appear to be a question of the conjoining of 
different representations in one unified experience, rather than the causal interaction between these 
representations. This also accords with the passage from the Third Analogy, where Kant says that 
‘in our mind all appearances, as contained in a possible experience, must stand in a community 
(communio) of apperception’ (A214/B261). Second, it would be surprising if Kant were talking 
about a commercium here, since only a page later he states categorically that ‘it is not the motion of 
matter that causes representations in us’ (A387), and later in the Paralogism that ‘it would never 
occur to anyone to take as an external cause what he has already recognized as a mere 
representation’ (A390). Neither of these claims seem consistent with a commercium between inner 
and outer appearances.  
31
 Hence the dependence of inner experience on outer experience in general, established in the 
Refutation of Idealism (B274-279), should not (and need not) be read as establishing necessary 
causal connections between objects of inner experience and objects of outer experience. 
32
 Ameriks (2000: 89). 
33
 Ameriks (2000: 90f.). 
34
 Cf. A530/B558f. For an argument that an appreciation of this point can help solve the problem of 
noumenal affection, see Piché (2004). 
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